Why Combatant Status Matters
Whether or not a person may lawfully be targeted during military operations depends on their legal status under international humanitarian law and, in some cases, domestic law. The distinction between combatants and civilians is not rhetorical or discretionary. It is a core legal rule determining when lethal force is permitted and when it is prohibited. Mislabeling civilians as combatants does not change their legal status, and doing so risks violating binding international law obligations.
The Foundational Rule: Distinction
The cornerstone of the law governing combatant status is the principle of distinction. Customary international humanitarian law requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and to direct operations only against combatants and other lawful military objectives. The obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants is a binding rule of international humanitarian law codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and recognized by the United States as customary international law, as reflected in the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.
This obligation applies in both international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. It is not optional and does not depend on how a state politically characterizes its opponent.
Who Qualifies as a Combatant in International Armed Conflict
At the treaty level, the modern formulation of this rule appears in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which requires parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and to direct military operations only against military objectives.
Although the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, it applies the civilian–combatant distinction as a binding rule governing targeting decisions. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual treats distinction as a foundational principle of the conduct of hostilities. In Chapter 2, the Manual explains that parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and must direct attacks only against military objectives.
The Manual further explains, in its chapter on the conduct of hostilities, that civilians are protected against being made the object of attack – unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. This protection turns on an individual’s conduct at the time of the attack, not on labels, affiliations, or past activity.
These targeting rules apply in both international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. In conflicts involving non-state armed groups, the Manual recognizes that civilians do not lose protection permanently. Instead, loss of protection is temporary and limited to the duration of direct participation in hostilities, reflecting the same temporal limitation found in customary international humanitarian law.
Critically, the law does not permit states to expand the category of lawful targets through unilateral designation. Describing individuals as “terrorists,” “criminals,” or “narco-traffickers” does not alter their legal status under the law of armed conflict. Whether a person may lawfully be targeted depends on objective facts about their function and conduct in relation to hostilities at the time force is used, not on executive characterization.
Non-International Armed Conflict and the Absence of “Combatant” Status
In non-international armed conflicts, such as conflicts between a state and non-state armed groups, the law operates differently. There is no formal combatant status equivalent to that found in international armed conflict. Instead, the key legal categories are civilians and members of organized armed groups. Members of organized armed groups who have a continuous combat function may be targeted on the same basis as combatants while that function persists.
Civilians lose protection from attack only for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. This temporal limitation is critical and prevents permanent loss of civilian protection based on sporadic or past conduct.
Direct Participation in Hostilities
Direct participation in hostilities is a narrowly defined concept. It requires a threshold of harm, direct causation, and a belligerent nexus. Acts such as transporting weapons to the front line or firing on opposing forces may qualify, while political support, propaganda, or general criminal activity does not.
Importantly, drug trafficking or other criminal conduct does not automatically constitute direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law unless it is closely linked to the conduct of hostilities in an armed conflict.
Protection for Persons Hors de Combat
Even individuals who are otherwise targetable may not be attacked if they are hors de combat. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacking persons who are defenseless due to surrender, wounds, or shipwreck, provided they abstain from hostile acts. This rule is reflected in Article 41 of Additional Protocol I.
This protection applies regardless of whether the individual was previously a combatant. Once a person is hors de combat, they must be treated humanely and may not be made the object of attack.
U.S. Law and the Law of War Manual
The United States has incorporated these principles into its own military doctrine. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual affirms the distinction between civilians and combatants and recognizes that civilians are protected from attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
The Manual also acknowledges the concept of continuous combat function for members of organized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts, aligning U.S. practice with customary international law.
Labeling Does Not Create Legal Authority
A recurring issue in modern conflicts is the tendency of governments to apply labels such as “terrorist,” “criminal,” or “narco-terrorist” to justify the use of military force. International humanitarian law does not recognize these labels as substitutes for legal analysis. Targeting decisions must be based on objective facts about an individual’s function and conduct at the time of attack, not on political characterizations. This principle follows directly from the rules on distinction and direct participation, not from discretionary executive judgment.
Why Evidence Matters
Because combatant status and loss of civilian protection are fact-dependent, access to reliable evidence is essential. Determining whether a person was a civilian, directly participating in hostilities, or hors de combat requires information about conduct, timing, and observable circumstances. Where the factual record is incomplete or withheld, legal conclusions about the lawfulness of an attack remain necessarily provisional.
