What Eliot Cohen Gets Wrong About the 2026 National Defense Strategy

Eliot Cohen, a respected political scientist, strategist, and author (among many other notable accolades), recently criticized the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a piece for The Atlantic (“Whatever This Is, It Is Not Strategy,” dated Jan. 29, 2026). 

In a follow-up interview on Feb. 1st on “The Shield of the Republic” podcast with Eric Edelman (featured below), Cohen doubled down on those points during an extended discussion of the document. While his concerns deserve consideration, many of them focus on presentation and tone rather than the substance of a strategy that offers a disciplined, prioritized vision for U.S. defense.

The Rollout

Cohen highlights the rollout itself as telling. 

He notes that the NDS "was the equivalent of shoving it over the transom at midnight on a Friday night with no fanfare, no rollout, no explication of the document." This low-key approach contrasts with the usual press conferences, media interviews, and congressional briefings that accompany such releases. Cohen sees it as evidence of insecurity or internal paralysis.

Yet the delivery method does not determine the document's merit. 

Strategies succeed or fail based on their content and alignment with national policy, not their public relations rollout. The 2026 NDS nests directly within the 2025 National Security Strategy. It translates broad political guidance into defense-specific priorities without unnecessary elaboration. This nesting reflects efficient hierarchy, not evasion.

Superficial Objections to Presidential Alignment

Cohen and Edelman spend considerable time on the document's references to President Trump. They describe it as filled with "mentions of the president at a level of ... sort of Saddam-like reverence" and call the tone "embarrassing" and " the sycophancy is so over the top." 

These complaints are ultimately tepid superficialism. The NDS is a policy document produced under civilian leadership. Alignment with the elected president's vision is not only appropriate; it is required. Cohen himself explored this dynamic in his book “Supreme Command.” There, he argues, drawing explicitly on Clausewitz, that civilians must direct military strategy to serve political ends. 

He acknowledges often rigid separations between political and (subordinate) military spheres, but insists that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument." The 2026 NDS embodies exactly that principle: military priorities flow from and support the administration's stated political objectives.

Prioritizing the Homeland and Hemisphere

The document's emphasis on "the homeland and the hemisphere almost to the exclusion of everything else" draws particular ire. 

Cohen acknowledges only "a kind of ritual bow to the importance of the Indo-Pacific." He questions whether this approach can produce "stable balances across all the theaters of the world."

This prioritization is not evasion. It represents a realistic assessment after two decades of global commitments that strained resources and public support. The four lines of effort are explicit: defend the U.S. homeland; deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength rather than confrontation; increase burden-sharing with allies and partners; and supercharge the U.S. defense industrial base. 

These choices focus American military power on vital interests while expecting allies to shoulder more responsibility in Europe and the Middle East. The recent Military.com article on the 2026 NDS explicitly explores this dynamic. This approach echoes the Weinberger doctrine's insistence on committing force only for vital stakes with clear objectives and sustainable means.

Clausewitzian Foundations Cohen Himself Endorses

Cohen's own scholarship strengthens the case for the NDS. In Supreme Command, he celebrates civilian leaders who actively shape military operations to advance political goals. The 2026 NDS performs that exact function. It subordinates defense planning to the political directives in the National Security Strategy, emphasizing homeland security, hemispheric influence, and selective engagement abroad. 

This is pure Clausewitz: military means in service of defined political ends.

Addressing Ends, Ways, and Means

Cohen's most substantive critique is that the document lacks detail on implementation. He argues there is "no discussion of programs that will get us there. There's no discussion of what resources it will take to get us there," and concludes that "if strategy is about ends, ways, and means, this is a document that's all about ends, and there's almost nothing about ways and means."

The NDS does provide directional guidance on ways and means. It calls for burden-sharing metrics, industrial base expansion, and focused deterrence in priority theaters. Full programmatic details belong in the budget process and follow-on guidance, not a high-level strategy document. The emphasis on ends, first and foremost, ensures coherence: political objectives drive resource decisions rather than the reverse.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy presents a clear prioritization of vital interests, alignment with civilian leadership, and nesting within the broader National Security Strategy. It represents strategic maturity. Cohen's dismissal overlooks these strengths in favor of critiques that are more stylistic than substantive. 

Service members and defense professionals deserve a debate grounded in the document's actual priorities rather than its tone or release timing. This strategy offers a path toward sustainable security. Dismissing it risks overlooking a pragmatic reset that aligns military power with America's most pressing political needs.